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1 Introduction
Access to user data by large companies in digital markets, especially Amazon, Facebook and
Google, has become a major focus of discussion in the competition and antitrust community.
The size of these companies is not a problem per se, the idea that big is not bad is an
established rule of competition policy. However, as the amount of information about users and
their preferences collected by these businesses grows exponentially there are several types of
data-related conducts/strategies that might raise competition and consumer harm concerns.
First, the collection and exploitation of data might raise barriers to entry when new entrants
or smaller companies are unable to collect or buy access to the same kind of data as incumbent
companies. A recent OECD report on Consumer data rights and competition(OECD, 2020a)
suggests that foreclosure could potentially occur, especially when a dominant rm has exclusive
access to consumer data. For instance, the incumbent could attempt to raise rivals costs or
barriers to entry by engaging in price discrimination strategies. The Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in its Digital Platforms Inquiry(2019) state that [...]the
breadth and depth of user data collected by the incumbent digital platforms provides them with
a strong competitive advantage, creating barriers to rivals entering and expanding in relevant
markets. Second, control over exclusive data can generate market power even without classical
market dominance, which is why in general a growing importance of situations of economic
dependenceof even large companies on certain platform or service operators can be observed
(Bougette et al., 2019). Third, while greater collection and use of personal data allows businesses
to improve the quality of their products/services, it also gives them a competitive advantage to
implement sophisticated forms of price discrimination, such as personalized pricing. As discussed
in the OECDs 2018 paper on Personalized Pricing in the Digital Era, the personalization of
prices generally improves e¢ ciency and often results in consumer gains by encouraging businesses
to compete more intensively for each consumer (Thisse and Vives, 1988; OECD, 2018). However,
in some circumstances, it may result in consumer and competition harm if implemented by
businesses with substantial market power (Bourreau and De Streel, 2018; OECD, 2018; OECD,
2020b).
In light of this, the new digital ecosystem has pushed competition and regulation bodies
around the globe to take actions to improve and adapt the regulatory frameworks for the digital
economy. The 10th Amendment of the German Competition Act, which entered into force
on January 19, 2021, is an example of such e¤ort. It addresses abuse of dominance and is
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intended to further shape and complete the regulatory framework of competition in the data-
driven economy (Budzinski, et al, 2020). Following the Amendment, irrespective of size, a
company is considered to have relative market power, if another company is dependent on it
for its own business strategies. Access to data is introduced as a crucial criterion. The refusal
to provide access to such data in exchange for an adequate fee may also constitute an abuse
(OECD, 2020b). This suggests that in the digital economy many companies might be exposed
to abuse by another company with relative or superior power due to its exclusive access to
competition-relevant data.
Although businesses use their personal databases to implement several commercial and mar-
keting strategies, this paper focuses only on the incumbentsuser data as an input for personal-
ized pricing. Amazon, for instance, competes side by side with many retailers which are clearly
in an information disadvantage position to design their pricing strategies if they lack access to
the required data. While Amazon can set lower prices to those consumers with lower willingness
to pay (e.g., those with a preference for the rivalsproducts), competitor retailers with no such
information have no alternative than charge a price ts all.
This paper focus on the following questions: In what circumstances can the incumbents
exclusive access to user data for personalized prices raise a barrier to entry? Does personalized
pricing help the incumbent to sustain its market dominance in case of a competitor entrance?
Can the incumbents control over data raise abuse of dominance concerns? Does personalized
pricing raise consumer harm concerns?
In order to provide an answer to these questions we build a two-period model. The pricing
game of our base model is close related to Thisse and Vives (1988). In this model two rms
located in the Hotelling line have both access to data on each consumers preferences (location)
and quote personalized prices accordingly. They show that personalized prices (henceforth PP)
benets consumers and harms industry prots.1 We depart from Thisse and Vivesmodel by
assuming that previous to price competition, a potential entrant takes into account that the
incumbent has exclusive access to data for pricing, and decides whether to incur the entry cost
F , or to stay out. If entry occurs, the new entrant lacks access to data for price discrimination,
thus it charges a uniform price (U). Another related paper is Gehrig et al. (2011) who study entry
decisions in a market where an incumbent rm engages in history-based price discrimination,
while the potential entrant has no data and faces no sunk and xed costs of entry. They nd
1Esteves, et al (2021) show that personalised prices can harm consumers at the expense of prots if consumer
preferences follow a non-uniform distribution.
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that dominance for an incumbent rm is invariant on the regimes with price discrimination and
uniform pricing. They also show that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by
history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. In contrast, we show that the
persistence of market dominance for an incumbent rm depends on the price regimes it adopts,
i.e. personalized or uniform pricing. Interestingly, our analysis highlights that consumers as
a whole are better o¤ under (PP,U) than under (U,U). Thus, as long as entry occurs, the
persistence of dominance after entry does not seem to pose consumer harm concerns.
Entry barriers can be introduced in several ways. The traditional approach to entry barriers
is to view them as stemming from having xed and sunk costs of entry. We also take this view.
As mentioned, we try to understand whether an incumbents access to data for personalized
prices is a tool to sustain its dominance and exclude new rms from the market.2
Our analysis o¤ers some insights to policy agencies. We show that in markets characterized
by su¢ ciently low entry costs, the incumbents ability to use its data for price discrimination
is not enough to exclude the rival from the market. In this case, although price discrimination
helps the incumbent to sustain its dominance, the intensied competition allows overall consumer
surplus to be above the non-discrimination counterpart. In these markets there are no reasons
for policy intervention. In contrast, for intermediate entry costs, the exclusive access to user
data for personalized pricing helps the incumbent to discourage entry in comparison to uniform
pricing. With no intervention, the incumbent ability to engage in personalized prices is an
e¤ective tool for consumer welfare exploitation and exclusion. Ignoring other e¤ects, personalized
pricing would only boost welfare if the demand expansion e¤ect outweighs the consumer surplus
extraction e¤ect, and would harm welfare otherwise. When consumer and welfare harm is proved,
apart from more extreme remedies such as prohibiting personalized pricing all together, other
remedies should be considered. We discuss the possibility of information sharing in exchange of a
fee and legal restrictions on the use of data for pricing. Other alternatives can also be considered
in order to improve market transparency, empower consumers with control over data, eventually
enhancing the ability of consumers to compare prices.3 If remedies are carefully designed, they
2Colangelo and Maggiolino (2018) note that  . . . the collection and aggregation of data, including personal
data, by dominant rms entrenches their dominant positions. Rubinfeld and Gal (2017) also argue that a
potential new entrant to the market without access to data might face several barriers to entry.
3Following the OECD, 2018 report on Personalised Pricing" some possible remedies are: (i) requiring the
rm to inform consumers that the prices or discounts o¤ered are personalised; (ii) requiring the rm to disclose
to consumers how the personalised pricing is calculated, including the personal information that was used to set
the price; (iii) requiring the rm to obtain consumerspermission to use their personal data to personalise prices;
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may have the e¤ect of reinforcing competition, and therefore reducing the risk of harm associated
to personalized pricing by a dominant rm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The
monopoly benchmark is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the equilibrium analysis.
In Section 5 we look at the possibility of information sharing in exchange of a fee. Section 6
is dedicated to the welfare analysis and Section 7 discusses our main policy implications. The
Appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
2 The model
Consider a horizontally di¤erentiated market where an incumbent company has exclusive access
to large volumes of user data, which has been collected and analyzed for a long period of time.
User data is nowadays recognized as an important input of many business strategies like person-
alized pricing, targeted advertising, product customization, to name few. As aforementioned,
user data can facilitate the implementation of sophisticated forms of price discrimination, such
as personalized pricing the focus of our analysis. Suppose an incumbent dominant platform,
say rm A, is challenged by the possibility of entry of a competitor, say rm B, which is in
a disadvantaged position with regard to access to user data. Specically, assume that data is
controlled by the incumbent rm. Firm A (B if entry occurs) is located at 0 (1) in the unit
interval. There is a population of consumers uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] ; with
mass normalized to 1. Each consumer wishes to buy a single unit either from rm A or B and is
willing to pay at most v: We will assume that v is su¢ ciently high so that nobody stays out of
the market under competition, i.e., v  3t2 (covered market): As usual a consumer located at x
incurs total cost pA+ tx if buys from rm A at the price pA, and incurs total cost pB+ t(1 x) if
buys the unit from B at the price pB. Since prices and prots are linear in t;under competition
to simplify the analysis we normalize t = 1:
The timing of the game is as follows. There are two periods. In the rst period, rm B
decides whether or not to enter in the market incurring the entry cost F  0: In the second
period, rm A and B (or only rm A, if B stays out) make(s) price decisions. As rm B has no
access to consumer data, it can only compete with a uniform pricing policy (henceforth U). In
contrast, the incumbent rm has the required data to implement a personalized pricing strategy
(henceforth PP). To simplify marginal cost of production is assumed to be equal to zero.
requiring the rm to publish a listed uniform price for all consumers who wish to opt out of personalised pricing.
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We will then discuss the implications of a possible remedy through which the incumbent
should provide the competitor access to data in exchange of a fee. In this new setting both rms
would be able to o¤er personalized prices.
3 Benchmark: Monopoly
Before proceeding it is useful to begin by considering a monopoly rm (or equivalently, a rm
with a super dominant position). If the rm can collect precise data about its consumers, simple
economics shows it may increase its prots by o¤ering personalized prices.4
Consider rst that the incumbent is not allowed to use its data for price discrimination,
thus its quotes a uniform price to all consumers. The indi¤erent consumer between buying its
product or not is located at x such that v   x   p = 0: This means that consumers located at
x  x decide to buy, and consumers located at x > x stay out of the market, with x = v   p:
Therefore, under uniform pricing the incumbent prot is  = p (v   p) ; with v   p  1: We can
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under uniform pricing when v  2 then, at the optimum, the monopolist




4 ; when v > 2 then, the monopolist
sets the optimal price p = v   1 and its prot is equal to uM = v   1:
Therefore, as v  2; some consumers are left out of the market under uniform pricing. In
contrast, if v > 2 all consumers are willing to buy the product. In terms of welfare, it follows


















4For example, Shiller (2014) estimates the increase in prot if Netix would introduce personalised prices.
According to the author, this would lead to an increase of prot for the company between 0.8% (if it used data
on consumer demographics) and 12.2% (if it used the browsing history of its consumers). Dubé and Misra (2017)
conducted an experiment on Ziprecruiter, an online recruiting company, comparing the existing uniform price
charged by Ziprecruiter, an optimized uniform price and targeted prices. They nd that the rms prots increase
by 65% when moving from the existing price to the optimized price, and increase further by 10% when adopting
targeted pricing.
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(v   (v   1)  x) dx = 1
2
(3)




Suppose now that the use of the incumbents data for personalized pricing is permitted.
Then, the incumbent sets a price p(x) to capture all the surplus from each consumer located at
x, i.e. v   p(x)  x = 0.
Proposition 2. When the incumbent uses its data for personalized pricing, the optimal
price for a consumer located at x is p(x) = v   x; for x 2 [0; 1] ; with corresponding prots
ppM = v 
1
2 : Consumer surplus and overall welfare are respectively, CS
pp





As said in a monopoly situation, a rm will benet from personalized pricing. When a rm
sets personalized instead of uniform prices, a two opposite e¤ects arise: some consumers with
high willingness-to-pay can be worse o¤ (appropriation e¤ect), while some consumers with low
willingness-to-pay can be better o¤ (demand expansion e¤ect). The appropriation e¤ect means
that moving from uniform pricing to personalized prices, the monopoly rm increases the price
charged to consumers with strong preferences (high willingness-to-pay). We will see that under
competition this might not occur. These consumers are then worse o¤ with personalized prices.
The demand expansion e¤ect arises because as the monopoly rm charges lower personalized
prices to consumers with low willingness-to-pay, they can now purchase the good while they
could not a¤ord it under uniform pricing. Thus, when v is su¢ ciently low (i.e., 32 < v <
2) in comparison to uniform pricing consumer surplus fall but welfare always increases with
personalized pricing due to a demand expansion e¤ect. When v > 2 as all consumers can a¤ord
the good under uniform pricing, then as expected aggregate consumer surplus and welfare fall
when the incumbent uses its data for personalized pricing.
Policy issues: When a super dominant company has access to user data for personalized
prices, any intervention to avoid consumer harm might be addressed through a combination of
complementary policy tools, including competition and antitrust policy, consumer protection
and data protection. Regarding antitrust law, a general per se prohibition of personalized
prices is usually not justied, however, if it can be proved that consumer surplus and welfare
falls with personalized prices in a specic case, the practice can be prohibited by the antitrust
rules. Following Bourreau and de Streel (2018) in the European Union, Article 101(1d) TFEU
and Article 102(c) TFEU prohibit specically anti-competitive discriminatory agreement and
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abuse of dominant position respectively. In this context, discrimination is dened as applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage. Within competition law, personalized pricing may potentially
be assessed under abuse of dominance rules, though there are some limitations to the application
of competition law in this area.5 Antitrust rules are better at condemning exclusionary price
personalization than regulating exploitative price personalization. So it is important to consider
whether the access to personal data for personalized pricing can help an incumbent to exclude
a competitor from the relevant market. We will look at this issue in the next section.
4 Equilibrium analysis
As usual we solve the game working backwards from the second period.
4.1 Second-period (Price decisions)
Consider rst the case where rm B enters. If for any reason the incumbent rm cannot use
data for personalized pricing (due, for instance, regulation, to legal restrictions, consumers
hiding strategies), the pricing game is a replication of the Hotelling model, and both rms quote
a uniform pricing (U,U). The equilibrium uniform price is pu;ui = 1; i = A;B: Firm A and Bs






2   F: In this situation all consumers
can buy the product (covered market) as long as v  32 : Thus, in what follows we impose that
restriction on v: If in contrast, rm B stays out, and the incumbent cannot use data for price
discrimination then rm A behaves as in Proposition 1.
Consider now the case where the incumbent faces no restrictions in the use of its collected
data for personalized pricing. Let pp;ui represent rms i price when rm A charges personalized
prices and rm B charges a uniform price. We can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3.
When the incumbent rm has access to data for personalized pricing and rm B enters, then
in equilibrium:
5The OECD (2018) states that this limitation arise beacuse (i) rules on abuse of dominance only apply to
rms that have substantial market power, which are in fact the circumstances under which personalised pricing
can cause more consumer harm; (ii) in several jurisdictions, exploitative abuses are either not prohibited by
competition law, or rarely investigated in practice; (iii) it is often unclear whether competition rules against
discrimination apply to business-to-consumer relationships.
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(i) each rms price is respectively equal to
pp;uA (x) =













  F . (8)
Proof.
See the Appendix.
Therefore, the rm that has access to the data makes higher prots than in the situation










and the rm without access to











Look next at the price e¤ects in comparison to (U,U), where both rms charge pu;u = 1:




buy from A at a price higher







buy from the incumbent






buy from B at price 12 (lower than the uniform price too). In
sum, the collection of detailed data for personalized prices even when implemented by a single
rm is not necessarily harmful to consumers as a whole. However, there might be winners
and losers among consumers. In comparison to the situation where no rm can use consumer
data for price discrimination, consumers with low willingness-to-pay or those who buy from
the non-discriminating will benet from personalized pricing. In contrast, consumers with high
willingness-to-pay will be hurt.
Can the incumbent sustain its market dominance in case of entry? Our analysis
highlights that an incumbent with ability to engage in personalized prices can maintain its
market dominance despite entry. Under the uniform pricing policy for both rms, i.e. (U,U),
each rm serves 50% of the market at price pu;u = 1: The same happens (as we will see in Section
5) if rms in the market have access to the same information about consumers for pricing, the
case (PP,PP). But this is not necessarily the case. When the incumbent has access to data, while
the entrant does not, in the pricing game the incumbent price discriminates and its rival charges
9
a uniform price (PP,U). In this situation, the incumbent serves 75% of the market and the
entrant 25%. Thus, our analysis highlights that even if entry occurs, the incumbent rm is able
to sustain its dominance. In sum, as long as entry occurs, dominance per se is not necessarily
harmful to consumers as a whole. With the exception of consumers with high willingness to pay
for the incumbents product
 




who are exploited, all the others are
better o¤ under (PP,U) than under (U,U).
4.2 First-period (Entry decision)
We now turn to period 1, where rm B decides whether or not to enter in the market.
Corollary 1.
If the incumbent rm cannot use its data for personalized prices, rm B enters as long as
F  12 ; otherwise it stays out. In contrast, if the incumbent is able to use its data for personalized
pricing, then rm B enters as long as F  18 : If
1
8 < F 
1
2 the incumbent exclusive access to
data for personalized pricing acts as a barrier to entry.
Our analysis highlights that if user data is commercially valuable, lack substitutes, and is
not shared across rms, then in fact the incumbents exclusive access to user data for price
discrimination purposes can limit the number of viable competitors and create a data bar-
rier to entry. In other words, the incumbentsability to employ consumer data collected for
personalized prices, acts to discourage entry by a rival rm in comparison to uniform pricing.
Under personalized prices the dominant rm is able to exclude a rival rm from the market in
the range of entry costs that would otherwise lead to entry under uniform pricing, specically







: This result suggests that the incumbentsaccess
to data for price discrimination can raise antitrust concerns.6 In markets that are relatively well
represented by these features, policy intervention plays an important role. Remedies such as
imposing a ban on the use of data for personalized prices or mandating some form of information
sharing could act to encourage entry and to restore competition in the market.
Personalized Prices and abuse of dominance: Abuse of dominance are any anti-
competitive business practices in which a dominant rm may engage in order to maintain or
increase its position in the market. In most jurisdictions, qualifying a conduct as an abuse of
dominance requires three fundamental conditions to be met: (1) the o¤ender must be dominant
in the relevant market; (2) the conduct must t a generally accepted category of abuse; and
6For arguments that Google benefts from a data barrier to entry, see Newman (2014).
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(3) the conduct must be shown to have anti-competitive e¤ects that are not counter-balanced
by e¢ ciencies. Firstly, the fact that provisions on abuse of dominance only apply to dominant
rms is consistent with the idea that, for a rm to be able to unilaterally harm the competitive
process, it must have a degree of market power in the relevant market. Secondly, as dominance is
in itself not unlawful, but only its abuse, it is necessary to identify an anti-competitive conduct
in order to establish an infringement. Antitrust rules are better at condemning exclusionary con-
ducts than exploitative ones. Following Akman (2009) [E]xclusionaryabuses refer to those
practices of a dominant rm which seek to harm the competitive position of its competitors
or to exclude them from the market, whereas exploitativeabuses can be dened as attempts
by a dominant rm to use the opportunities provided by its market strength in order to harm
customers directly.
Our analysis highlights that in some circumstances it might be possible to qualify personal-
ized pricing as an exclusionary abuse, specically whenever an incumbent rm use its user data
and its pricing strategies to target lower prices to customers with a preference for competitors
products, in an attempt to foreclose the market. When this happens the incumbent is able to
maintain its super dominant position with serious harm on competition and consumer welfare.
Finally, following the 10th Amendment of the German Competition Act 2021, in assessing mar-
ket dominance, particular account shall be taken of a companys access to data and its e¤ects
on market entry and competition. Furthermore, the refusal to provide access to such data in
exchange for an adequate fee may also constitute an important form of abuse in the digital
economy. We look at this issue next.
5 Information sharing
In the case of a companys exclusive access to competition-relevant data, a critical question
relates to the nature of the remedy that could be used to restore competition and o¤set the harm
to consumer welfare. As discussed, this is especially important in markets with intermediate
entry costs.
Suppose now that the incumbent can share its user data with the entrant in exchange of a
fee, say f  0:When both rms have access to data, price discrimination is a dominant strategy
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for each player, and the pricing game is similar to Thisse and Vives (1988). Each rms price is:
pA(x) =
8<: 1  2x if x  120 if x > 12 ;
pB(x) =
8<: 2x  1 if x  120 if x < 12 :
When both rms have the same information, personalized pricing may actually result in rms
competing more aggressively for each individual consumer, increasing the incentive of rms to
reduce prices.








  f   F with f + F  1
4
:
Therefore, when both rms have access to data, the incumbent makes lower prots than




















16   f   F

.
Next we look at rm Bs entry decisions. If the entrant were able to have access to the
incumbents data costlessly (i.e., f = 0), it would decide to enter as long as F < 14 (rather than
when F < 18 under no access to data). If a mandatory costlessly data sharing where imposed by
way of regulation, the likelihood of restoring competition would be higher. However, a remedy
should not act as a sanction. Imposing the incumbent the obligation to share its information
for free with competitors might give rise to other problems. First, the incumbent could simply
give the competitor access to raw data. It is not clear whether the competitor would gain from
this solution. We should take into account that much of the value of data can come from how it
is processed, in terms of organization and analytics, which can be costly and take time (Katz,
2019). On the other hand, data can be used by the incumbent to improve quality, product and
service innovation, something we are ignoring in this model. Thus, it is important that the
remedy does not create disincentives to invest in information technology and analytics across a
long period of time.
Consider now the case where f > 0: Entry occurs as long as F  14  f: If entry were costless
(F = 0), the incumbent could receive a fee not higher than 14 ; and realize a prot equal to
1
4 + f 
1
2 : If the fee reaches the maximum value B would be willing to pay, the incumbent
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prot would be equal to 12 and the entrant prot would be null. A remedy like this would help
the incumbent to overcome the prisonersdilemma that arises in Thisse and Vives (1980) when
both rms have access to the same piece of information. It would also boost overall consumer
surplus. However, would the incumbent decide to refuse a solution like this? Put di¤erently,
what is the minimum fee that makes the incumbent willing to share its data with a competitor?
Comparing the worst scenario for the incumbent, which arises when entry occurs, we nd
that p;pA   
p;u
A  0 as long as f 
5
16 : The minimum value for the fee would be equal to
5
16 :
Even when F = 0 the potential entrant cannot support a fee like this. This suggests that if a
regulator or competition authority mandates the incumbent to share its data with competitors,
they would need to impose a fee, which means that they would also have to be involved in the
determination of questions regarding the fee. Other important aspects related to data sharing
remedies would be the quantity and quality of datasets, and the interplay between the data
sharing remedy and the GDPR.
6 Welfare analysis
This section looks at consumer surplus (CS) and overall welfare (W ) under the di¤erent market
conditions and pricing policies we have analyzed so far. The case of monopoly was already
presented in section 3. When rm B enters and the incumbent is not allowed to use its data
for price discrimination, both quote the uniform price which is equal to 1 and all consumers






(v   pu;u   x)dx = v   5
4
; (9)
W u;u = u;uA + 
u;u
B   F + CS
u;u = v   F   1
4
: (10)
When rm B enters and the incumbent can use its user data for personalized pricing, while










(v   pp;uB   (1  x))dx = v   1; (11)




Finally, if in case of entry, competition policy or regulation mandates the incumbent to share
its data with the competitor in exchange of a fee f; then both are able to charge personalized









W p;p = v   4
16
  F: (14)
The next table summarizes rmsprots (A and B), consumer surplus (CS) and welfare
(W ) under the di¤erent market structures and price regimes. The last raw of the table presents
the case where the incumbent provides the entrant access to its data for pricing in exchange of
a fee. The reader should take into account that v  32 and when entry occurs F 
1
8 :
Table 1: Prots, consumer surplus and welfare















(PP) v   12   v  
1
2 0 v  
8
16









(U): v > 2 v   1   v   1 12 v  
8
16
(PP,PP) 14 + f
4
16   f   F
1





Proposition 5. Consider the case where access to data is not provided:
(i) Consumer surplus is higher when an incumbent rm with access to data, exposed to
competition from new entry, is able to engage in personalized prices, than if it does not.
(ii) Overall welfare is higher when the incumbent rm is not able to use its data for price
discrimination if entry occurs.
(iii) If entry does not occur, the use of data by a monopolistic rm for price discrimination
harms consumers at the expense of prots when v > 2: If 32 < v < 2; the use of incumbents
data for price discrimination harms consumers as a whole but boosts prots and welfare due to
the demand expansion e¤ect.
In what follows we discuss the consumer and overall welfare e¤ects. We distinguish three
cases taking into account the likelihood of entry. In the rst case entry costs are su¢ ciently
low, i.e. F  18 , which means that the incumbents access to data is not enough to block the
entry. The second case, the most relevant for policy intervention, entry costs are intermediate,
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specically 18 < F 
1
2 : If the incumbent were not able to charge personalized prices, either
because it has no data or because price discrimination is for any reason not permitted, the
competitor would always decide to enter. In contrast, if the incumbent is able to compete with
personalized pricing, then its data/pricing exibility advantage acts to exclude the rival from
the market. In the last case, entry costs are so high that, regardless of any access to data, entry
never occurs.
Starting with the rst case, the expressions presented in table 1 reveal that CSp;u CSu;u > 0:








. In contrast, in
markets where entry is costless or cheap, although access to data for the personalization is good
for aggregate consumer welfare, it is harmful for overall welfare, as W p;u  W u;u < 0: This is
basically due to more ine¢ cient shopping. Under uniform pricing consumers always buy from






buy from the less preferred rm under discrimination (i.e., from the incumbent), which is
less e¢ cient than buying from B.







. The incumbentsability to employ consumer
data collected for personalized prices, acts to discourage entry by a rival rm in comparison
to uniform pricing. This harms consumers but also welfare when price discrimination has no
demand expansion e¤ect. The same welfare e¤ects are produced when F is high.
Finally, consider next the welfare e¤ects associated to a policy intervention that mandates
the incumbent to share its data with the entrant in exchange of a fee. Our analysis reveals
that when entry occurs consumer, then CSp;p > CSp;u > CSu;u: Thus, conditional on entry,
consumer surplus is in fact maximized when both rms are able to use data for personalized
prices. In markets with su¢ ciently low entry costs, i.e., F < 18 ; any restriction on the use of
data for price discrimination would cause consumer harm. If the criterion is aggregate welfare
we conclude that W p;p = W u;u > W p;u: Thus, an information sharing remedy would have the
same e¤ect on welfare than not permitting the use of data for personalized prices.
Following the welfare analysis, the next section presents the main policy implications of our
analysis.
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7 Policy implications and nal remarks
As aforementioned the 10th Amendment of the German Competition Act which entered into
force on January, 19 2021, addresses abuse of dominance and is intended to further shape and
complete the regulatory framework of competition in the data-driven economy. Following the
Amendment, market power might arise from the fact that a company is dependent for its own
business strategies, like pricing, on access to data controlled by another company. In our model
user data is a key input for the implementation of sophisticated price discrimination strategies,
such as personalized pricing. Amazon, for instance, competes side by side with many retailers
which are clearly in an information disadvantage position to design their pricing strategies.
The refusal to provide access to such data in exchange for instance of an adequate fee may
also constitute an abuse. This suggests that in the digital economy many companies may
be expose to abuse by another company with relative or superior power due to its exclusive
access to competition-relevant data. Further, the OECD (2020a) suggests that foreclosure could
potentially occur when a dominant rm has exclusive access to consumer data. The same
concerns are raised by ACCC (2019) which states that the incumbent could attempt to raise
rivalscosts or barriers to entry by engaging in price discrimination strategies.
Our analysis has tried to shed some light on these concerns. It is important to note that
policy intervention may depend on the legal standard or general mission of the competition law
in a specic jurisdiction. According to a survey by the ICN (2011), in 89% of the jurisdic-
tions consumer welfare is the primary goal or one of the goals of competition law, but there
are other countries where the standard is total welfare.7 As is referred in the OECD (2018)
report [A]mong those countries where consumer welfare is one of the goals, some also have the
institutional role of promoting e¢ ciency (not necessarily passed through to consumers), poten-
tially requiring the respective competition authorities to balance a trade-o¤ between total and
consumer welfare.
Before proceeding, when personalized pricing does not reect di¤erent marginal costs of
serving di¤erent consumers, as is the case in our model, competition authorities may consider
following the next steps in order to determine whether such conduct is abusive. First, it is
important to exist dominance. While personalized pricing can be observed in markets that are
relatively competitive, there is a higher risk of exploitation when a rm has substantial market
7For instance, overall welfare is the standard welfare criterion in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway,
to name few.
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power in the relevant market. In fact, establishing dominance is a legal requirement in most
jurisdictions to apply rules on abuse of dominance. Second, an infringement should only be
established if there is evidence of harm. As discussed, di¤erent authorities may give a di¤erent
weight to consumer welfare and total welfare, depending on the antitrust standard of a particular
jurisdiction. Even if personalized pricing harms consumers by increasing average prices, this does
not necessarily merit an antitrust intervention, as those e¤ects may be temporary and likely to
be resolved by the market (this would be the case if the entrant were able to get data across
time). In contrast, an intervention may be needed when the existence of barriers to entry extend
the negative e¤ects over time. Finally, identifying the source of the personalized pricing can be
useful to dene the appropriate remedies. As said, price discrimination can be facilitated by
many factors, such as data collection, lack of price transparency, to name few.
Next we highlight under what market conditions personalized pricing by a dominant rm
is assessed to have negative and persistent negative e¤ects on consumers and competition. We
rst discuss the case where the incumbent access to data for personalized pricing cannot block
entry.
Data access raises no barrier to entry: in markets where the likelihood of entry is
high due to su¢ ciently low entry costs (i.e., 0  F  18), consumers are clearly better o¤ in
comparison to a monopoly market. As expected if entry occurs, competition boosts consumer
surplus. Consider rst the case where the incumbent is not allowed to use its consumer data
for price discrimination. In this situation, both rms compete with uniform prices, (U,U), and
each serves 50% of the market. The incumbent looses its dominance. In contrast, if no policy
restriction is imposed on the use of data by the incumbent for pricing, it can set personalized
prices while the entrant sets a uniform price, (PP,U). In this scenario, we conclude that price
discrimination helps the incumbent to sustain its dominance, by serving 75% of the market. Our
results are in sharp contrast with Gehrig, et al (2011) who nd that dominance for an incumbent
rm is invariant on the regimes with price discrimination (behavior-based price discrimination)
and uniform pricing. In our setting, the persistence of market dominance does depend on
the price regimes for the incumbent , i.e., personalized or uniform pricing. More interestingly,
Proposition 5 highlights that consumers as a whole are better o¤under (PP,U) than under (U,U).
Thus, the persistence of dominance after entry does not seem to pose aggregate consumer harm
concerns. Price discrimination intensies competition between duopolists and boosts overall
consumer surplus. Although it is true that personalized pricing favours some consumers while
leaving others worse-o¤, the analysis of the e¤ects should be based on consumer welfare as a
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whole, and not on the harm imposed on a subgroup of individuals. This suggests that apart
from other concerns related, for instance, to privacy and fairness issues, which beyond the goals
of this model, competition authorities that prioritize the promotion of consumer welfare have
no good reasons to prohibit the use of data by an incumbent in the case of entry.
Finally, competition authorities that give more weight to total welfare may nd personalized
pricing to be harmful, and so they might be opened to consider policy restrictions on the use
of data for pricing by a dominant rm. It is interesting to note that this trade-o¤ between
consumer welfare and total welfare is very specic to personalized pricing (the same happens
in merger review), not being commonly observed in other types of abuse that generally a¤ect
consumer welfare and total welfare in a similar way.
Data access raises a barrier to entry: As aforementioned, in terms of policy intervention,
the most relevant markets are those exhibiting intermediate entry costs, specically 18 < F 
1
2 :
If the incumbent were not able to charge personalized prices, either because it has no data or
because price discrimination is for any reason not permitted, the competitor would always decide
to enter. In contrast, if the incumbent is able to compete with personalized pricing, then its
data/pricing exibility advantage acts to exclude the rival from the market. Without any policy
intervention to restore competition in the relevant market, the incumbentsexclusive access to
data for price discrimination, acts as a data barrier to entry. Firm B decides to stay out of the
market, and rm A is able to sustain its monopoly position and capture all consumer surplus.
In this scenario the potential abuse associated with PP by a dominant rm is exploitation with
exclusion.
In markets like this a critical question relates to the nature of the remedy that can o¤set
consumer harm and restore competition. In such a situation, a competition authority might
restore the level of competition that would otherwise exist by (i) not permitting the incumbent
to use data for pricing (U,U) and (ii) by mandating the incumbent to grant some form of access
to its data to the entrant (P,P).
We saw that a remedy restricting the use of data for personalized prices would restore
competition at (U,U) at the benet consumers and overall welfare. Another possible remedy,
with some associated problems, would be to mandate the incumbent to grant some form of
access to its data to the entrant. When all competing rms have access to the same information
about consumerstastes and preferences, the intensity of competition increases, with a positive
impact on consumer welfare, which reaches its maximum value at (PP,PP) and on social surplus.
However, if authorities decide to impose an information data sharing remedy, and if this is done
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in exchange of a fee, our analysis suggests that the fee the entrant can support is below the
level the incumbent is willing to share its data. Thus, if a regulator or competition authority
mandates the incumbent to share its data with competitors, they would need to impose a fee,
which means that regulators would also have to be involved in the determination of questions
regarding the value of the fee and other aspects such as monitor the quantity and quality of data
shared. This would require antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper
price and other terms of dealing and monitoring such activity. Competition authorities and
antitrust courts are not best placed for such tasks. Additionally, an information sharing remedy
needs to comply with the principles and rules of the GDPR. In view of that, a remedy restricting
the use of data for price discrimination purposes could be a more e¤ective remedy to restore
competition and o¤set consumer harm.
Finally, the risk of consumer harm from personalized pricing by a dominant rm might be
addressed through a combination of complementary policy tools, including competition policy,
consumer protection and data protection, as well as anti-discrimination laws. E¤ective en-
forcement may therefore require the coordination of competition, consumer and data protection
authorities. Apart from more extreme remedies such as prohibiting personalized pricing all to-
gether, some alternatives for future consideration in line of OECD (2018) are (i) requiring the
rm to inform consumers that the prices or discounts o¤ered are personalized; (ii) requiring
the rm to obtain consumerspermission to use their personal data to personalize prices; (iii)
requiring the rm to publish a listed uniform price for all consumers who wish to opt out of
personalized pricing. If remedies are carefully designed, they can be an e¤ective tool to avoid
entry barriers and abuse of dominance linked to the access of personal data in digital markets.
Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given rm Bs uniform price PB the indi¤erent consumer between
buying from A and B is located at
PA(x) = PB + (1  2x): (15)
As we assume c = 0 the lowest price rm A is willing to charge to a more distant consumer
is equal to 0. Therefore, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from A at the lowest
price and from B at price PB is located at x such that










Therefore, rm As demand is x while rm Bs demand is 1 x: It is now possible to determine









From the FOC for the prot maximization with respect to PB we obtain that PB = 12 : Thus,
in equilibrium, rm B quotes P B =
1






serves all consumers in the remaining interval, i.e., those consumers who belong to the interval
0; 34

: Substituting PB by 12 in PA(x) we nd that:
P A(x) =
8<: (32   2x) if x  340 if x  34
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